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vABSTRACT 
Each year the Department of Defense (DoD) prepares and submits a 
budget request through the President to Congress.  Not only does Defense the  
believe they need the resources that they ask for in the budget, but they also 
request a certain level of flexibility in spending in order to meet the challenges of 
an uncertain future with a changing threat environment.  When Congress 
increases their control over spending, the DoD’s flexibility in spending directly 
decreases.  So understanding Congressional control over Defense through the 
budget is important for Defense management. 
Levels and trends in Congressional control over Defense spending have 
been studied in the past.  The goal of this thesis is to determine if the levels and 
trends in Congressional control of Defense spending within the post-Cold War 
era are consistent with those observed in the Cold War era.  Comparative 
analysis through the use of graphs and statistics is the methodology used to 
determine the degree of consistency between time periods.  Results show that 
the increasing trends of Congressional control over Defense spending observed 
in the Cold War era have significantly leveled off.  It seems as if Congress has 
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1I. INTRODUCTION 
A. SUBJECT AND RELEVANCE 
 The Department of Defense (DoD) prepares and submits a budget each 
year to Congress (with concurrence through the President).  This proposed 
budget is determined by analyzing present and predicted future threat conditions 
and the amount of resources needed to meet those threats.  The DoD and other 
participants including the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency 
spend a great deal of time and effort determining the most accurate threat level.  
Likewise, the DoD spends an incredible amount of time and energy determining 
the best way to meet those threats including the resources required to do so.  
Based on this information, it seems likely that no one knows how to spend DoD 
appropriations better than the DoD itself.  Likewise, it seems plausible that no 
one knows how much the DoD needs to spend each year better than the DoD.  
The fact that Congress controls Defense spending might suggest that they feel 
this is not true.   
 Not only does the DoD believe they need the resources that they ask for in 
the budget, but they also request a certain level of flexibility in spending in order 
to meet the challenges of an uncertain future with a changing threat environment.  
When Congress increases their own control over spending, this flexibility in 
spending directly decreases.  So understanding Congressional control over 
Defense through the budget is important for Defense management.1 
 Levels of Congressional control of Defense spending have been studied in 
the past.  Understanding the trends of the past is often a very useful way to 
prepare for the future.  Therefore, this information might be used as a tool for 
predicting the level of DoD spending flexibility in the future.  Understanding future 
spending flexibility could eventually lead the DoD to a more effective and efficient 
budgeting process in years to come. 
                                            
1 Philip J. Candreva and L. R. Jones, “Congressional Control over Defense and Delegation of 
Authority in the Case of the Defense Emergency Response Fund” Armed Forces and Society 32, 
no. 1 (October 2005): 108. 
2B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 The main question addressed by this thesis is whether the trends in 
Congressional oversight of Defense spending observed during the Cold War era 
have continued in the post-Cold War era.  In an effort to answer this question, 
lower-level questions are also examined:  What were the trends in Congressional 
control of Defense spending during the Cold War?  What have been the trends in 
Congressional control of Defense spending since the end of the Cold War?   
What is meant by control?  How are these trends measured?  How are these 
trends compared?  What degree of similarity constitutes consistency? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
 Jones and Bixler analyzed the trends in Congressional control over 
Defense spending during the Cold War era and concluded that the level of 
control was increasing.2  To support their conclusion, Jones and Bixler described 
what they believed were specific indicators of Congressional control.  Some of 
the indicators described by Jones and Bixler include the number of pages and 
amendments in the Defense authorizations and appropriations bills and number 
of hearings before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.  Besides 
mentioning the indicators, they also graphed and analyzed annual data 
associated with each of the indicators.  As a whole Jones and Bixler’s data 
ranged from 1960 to 1990 (while the data from any one indicator was only a 
subset of that range).  This is what the author of this thesis considers to be data 
from the Cold War era. 
 This thesis extends and compares Jones and Bixler’s findings on 
Congressional control to those of the post-Cold War years.  Many of the same 
indicators that Jones and Bixler described are also examined in this thesis.  Data 
were obtained from the Thomas Library of Congress website3 which contains an 
archive of bills and government documents that, in some cases, go back as far 
                                            
2 L. R. Jones and Glenn. C. Bixler, Mission Financing to Realign National Defense 
(Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1992): 45-85. 
3 Thomas Library of Congress. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/abt_thom.html (accessed 
September – December 2006). 
3as 1991.  The House Armed Services Committee (HASC)4  and Senate Armed 
Services Committee (SASC)5 websites contain archives of their committee 
reports as well as information related to their hearings schedules. 
D. SCOPE 
 This thesis is a comparative analysis of the levels of Congressional control 
of Defense spending over two periods of time.  As mentioned, researchers have 
studied these levels of control in the past.  However, much of the data needs to 
be updated, analyzed, and compared to the data of the past.  Specifically, this is 
the subject and role of this study. 
 This thesis examines the levels of Congressional control over Defense 
spending during the Cold War era, updates this information with post Cold War 
data, analyzes any trends across or differences between the levels of 
Congressional control within the two eras, and discusses inferences from the 
data. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
 This thesis is organized as follows:  First, a background on why Congress 
controls Defense spending, how Congress controls Defense spending, and 
specific ways to measure Congressional oversight is provided.  The next section 
contains Cold War and post Cold War data.  The data are visually depicted on 
line graphs.  Any changes in the two periods are analyzed for each indicator of 
Congressional control.  The following section provides a summary of 
Congressional control over Defense spending during the Cold War era as 
described in Jones and Bixler’s Chapter Four6.  Then an empirical analysis is 
provided.  The last section of this thesis draws inferences from the data and 
identifies areas for further study. 
 
                                            
4 House Armed Service Committee. http://www.house.gov/hasc/ (accessed September – 
December 2006). 
5 Senate Armed Service Committee. http://armed-services.senate.gov/index.htm (accessed 
September – December 2006). 
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5II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE POWER TO CONTROL 
 In the 1780s the forefathers of this nation adopted the Constitution of the 
United States of America.  In some instances the specific language they used 
within this document was vague enough to allow for flexibility to deal with 
contingencies.  However, other portions of the Constitution are much more rigid 
and specific.  It seems likely that they intentionally used this writing style where 
they felt future uncertainties were secondary or altogether unimportant.  In 
essence they believed, regardless of what the future held, this Country would be 
a strong, lasting, democratic nation only if these specific statements were 
followed without variance in interpretation.  One instance of this is quoted below. 
 
 No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence 
of Appropriations made by Law.7 
 
 The forefathers believed that having a separation of power between 
Congress and Defense was a way to keep the strength of Defense at an 
optimal level.  This was a way of increasing the likelihood that the military 
could be strong enough to deter and/or defeat possible enemy states, but 
not have the power necessary to threaten the government.8  Peter Feaver 
comments on this balance of control by stating, “...the challenge is to 
reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to 
with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilian authorities 
authorize them to do.”9  
 It does not seem likely that Congress is overly concerned now with 
Defense attempting to overthrow the U.S. Government in today’s environment.  
This might be directly related to the fact that Congress has so much control over 
                                            
7 Article 1, Section 9 of The Constitution of the United States of America. 
8 Candreva and Jones, 105. 
9 Peter Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Hunting, Janowitz and the Question of 
Civilian Control” Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 149. 
6Defense.  Besides having the power to appropriate money for Defense, the 
Constitution also provides other authorities that Congress has over Defense.  
These include the power to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a 
navy, declare war, and many more.10  It is clear that the Constitution provides 
Congress with the ability to exercise a great deal of control of over Defense.  The 
Constitution, however, does not specify the amount of control that should be 
exercised.  This is left up to Congress to decide.  Since Congress has the ability 
to form and shape the military, it seems plausible that one of the factors they 
consider in this decision is the national threat level.  The next section briefly 
discusses the threat level, how it has changed since the end of the Cold War, 
and why this might affect Congressional control over Defense. 
B. CHANGING TIMES 
 During the years of the Cold War the primary military mission for the 
United States was to defend the nation and allies from the symmetric Soviet 
threat of aggression.  This was time when the enemy was known and reasonably 
understood.  The Soviet Union was a superpower with nuclear capability that 
could potential kill millions.  For this reason US military leaders developed and 
executed a strategy to meet and deter the Soviet threat.  This strategy included a 
certain amount of military personnel located in specific locations throughout 
Europe and Asia, the required quantities and types of weapon systems, and the 
plans to execute particular missions. 
 Between 1989 and 1991 the Cold War ended with the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact and later the Soviet Union.  The United States currently no longer 
faces the immediate threat from a major nuclear enemy; rather the threats faced 
today are largely asymmetric.  Many come in the form of suicidal members of 
extremist terrorists groups.  The battle fronts have become blurred and frequency 
of urban combat is dramatically increasing.  Deterrence by military strength does 
not seem to be as practical as it once was.  The threat has changed, and 
therefore the US military strategy has and will continue to change. 
                                            
10 Article I, Section 8 of The Constitution of the United States of America. 
7 The basis for this thesis is to determine if the change in military threat 
conditions due to the cessation of the Cold War has also had an impact on the 
level of Congressional control over Defense spending.  As mentioned, Congress 
has the ability to be a very influential in Defense matters.  It seems plausible that 
Congress might want to give Defense more flexibility in spending so they can 
more efficiently and effectively adapt to this change.  In this case Congress 
would reduce the level of their control over Defense spending.  With that said, it 
also seems conceivable that many members of Congress have their own ideas 
for how Defense should adapt to this change.  This would lead to members of 
Congress increasing their control over Defense to ensure that their agendas are 
heeded and accommodated. 
C. WHY CONGRESS CONTROLS DEFENSE SPENDING 
 Candreva and Jones list several reasons why Congress controls Defense 
spending.  These reasons include the legitimate exercise of constitutional power, 
policy influence, media publicity of DoD mismanagement, and to advocate or 
protect constituent interests.11  Legitimate exercise of constitutional power means 
that Congress controls Defense spending because the law states that they have 
the power to do so.12  Since they legally can, they will.   
The next reason, policy influence, is based on the idea that controlling 
spending is a way in which they can ensure that resources are allocated in a way 
that meets their own specific interests.13  It is not uncommon for the interests of 
Congressmen to reflect the interests of their constituents as well.14  This is 
particularly true around election time.  If members of Congress do not advocate 
and protect the interests of the people that elected them, it is likely that they 
                                            
11 Candreva and Jones, 109. 
12 MacKubin Thomas Owens, “Micromanaging the Defense Budget,” Public Interest, no. 100 
(Summer 1990): 142-144. 
13 Kenneth R. Mayer, "Policy Disputes as a Source of Administrative Controls: Congressional 
Micromanagement of the Department of Defense," Public Administration Review 53, no. 4 (1993): 
293-296. 
14 W. D. Hartung, "The Shrinking Military Pork Barrel: The Changing Distribution of Pentagon 
Spending, 1986-1996" The Changing Dynamics of U. S. Defense Spending, ed. Leon V. Sigal 
(Westport, CT: Praeger), 29-84. 
8won’t get reelected.15  The last reason mentioned here is the response to media 
publicity of DoD mismanagement.  This is based on the idea that Congress 
controls Defense spending because situations in the past have caused Congress 
to feel mistrust in the DoD’s ability to manage spending.16 
D. HOW CONGRESS CONTROLS DEFENSE SPENDING 
 Now that some of the reasons why Congress controls the Defense 
spending have been outlined, it is necessary to examine some of the different 
ways that Congress controls Defense spending.  Two of the ways mentioned by 
Candreva and Jones include earmarking funds and through formal information 
gathering.17   
Earmarks take the form of law when they are contained within statutory 
legislation.  When this is the case, they are often referred to as a form of 
statutory budget controls.  These controls serve many purposes for Congress.  
They can establish executive departments and agencies and prescribe their form 
of organization; authorize programs and activities; specify the characteristics of 
programs, goals and major policies; regulate personnel; delineate operating 
procedures and methodologies for accomplishing work; impose limitations and 
conditions on daily activities; and appropriate financial resources for operation.18   
Formal information gathering is conducted by means of reviews, hearings, 
audits, investigations and any documentation required by Congress to gain 
insight on program progression and/or spending information.  It seems logical 
that the more information that Congress requests is directly related to the level of 




                                            
15 James M. Lindsay, "Congressional Oversight of the Department of Defense: 
Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom," Armed Forces and Society 17, no. 1 (Fall 1990): 7-33. 
16 J. Ronald Fox, The Defense Management Challenge Weapons Acquisition (Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business School Press, 1988), 80-83. 
17 Candreva and Jones, 109. 
18 J. P. Harriss, Congressional Control of Administration (The Brookings Institute, 1964), 8. 
9E. MEASURING CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL 
Jones and Bixler state that “...statutory budget controls are manifest 
primarily in annual defense authorization and appropriation legislation.”19  They 
also suggest that there is strong positive correlation between the amount of these 
controls and the number of pages within these types of legislation.20  For this 
reason, one of the methodologies they use to measure Congressional control is 
to analyze the number of pages in legislative documents including Defense 
authorization and appropriation bills and accompanying committee reports.   
Another measurement technique they use is to simply count the number of 
general provisions found within the annual Defense appropriation bills.  General 
provisions are basically earmarks that often specify exactly how and how much 
money is to be spent of particular resources.   Jones and Bixler suggest that 
there is a positive correlation between the number of general provisions found 
within the legislation and amount of Congressional control.21 
Jones and Bixler also state that Congress exercises control over defense 
spending “...during House and Senate debates on annual Defense authorization 
and appropriations bills.”22  Jones and Bixler suggest that the number of 
amendments to these bills during such debates is correlated with the amount of 
control Congress uses over Defense spending. 
As mentioned earlier, Congress also controls Defense spending by the 
means of information gathering.  In particular, Jones and Bixler address the 
number of hearings held by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and 
the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)23.  Jones and Bixler suggest that 
the number of hearings and number of witnesses per hearing are directly related 
to the amount of information the HASC and/or SASC requires, and this is 
correlated with the amount of control Congress imposes over defense spending.  
Another interesting element of information gathering Jones and Bixler examine is 
                                            
19 Jones and Bixler, 45. 
20 Ibid., 49. 
21 Ibid., 78. 
22 Ibid., 54. 
23 Ibid., 72. 
10
who the witnesses to the HASC and SASC hearings represent.  Are they 
members of the DoD, government personnel other than DoD, or lobbyist (special 
interest groups, think tanks, academia, etc.)?  Scheir states that non-DoD 
“groups are playing an increasingly important part in structuring the flow of 
information to legislative assemblies.24  Jones and Bixler also suggest that one of 
the reasons Congress is using a broader base of witnesses is to get, what 
Congress might consider, a clearer picture of information related to Defense 
spending.25  Therefore the use of non-DoD witnesses in HASC and SASC 
hearings is a method Congress uses to control Defense spending.  Hence, a 
positive correlation exists between the number and percentage of non-DoD 
witnesses and the amount of Congressional control over Defense spending. 
 This chapter provided reasons why and how Congress controls Defense 
spending, and discussed some specific measurable indicators of the level of 
Congressional control over Defense spending.  The next chapter contains a 
presentation and analysis of the data for each of those indicators.  Specifically, 
the next chapter addresses the question how much each indicator of 
Congressional control has changed since the Cold War era. 
                                            
24 E. Scheir, Legislators’ New Sources of Information and Misinformation. Paper presented at 
the 1969 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York (October 
1974). 
25 Jones and Bixler, 72. 
11
III. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
 Chapter II described some methods for measuring the levels of 
Congressional control over Defense spending as characterized by Jones and 
Bixler.  This chapter presents Jones and Bixler’s data from the Cold War era and 
compares it to the corresponding data from the post-Cold War years.  The goal is 
to determine if a change has occurred in the level of Congressional control over 
Defense spending since the end of the Cold War. 
The indicators of Congressional control over Defense spending are 
categorized here under two headings, controlling through legislation and 
controlling by information gathering.  The Congressional control indicators in the 
legislation category are the number of pages in several legislative documents, 
number of total amendments in the Defense authorization and appropriation bills, 
and number of general provisions in the Defense appropriation bill.  The 
Congressional control indicators in the information gathering category are the 
number of hearings before the HASC and SASC and the specific makeup (DoD 
personnel, non-DoD government personnel, or lobbyists/special interest groups) 
of the witnesses within those hearings.  Jones and Bixler concluded that the level 
of Congressional control over Defense spending was increasing during the Cold 
War era. 26 
Each indicator of Congressional control is analyzed by first presenting the 
Cold War data from Jones and Bixler.  While the Cold War had no clear ending 
date, most of their data ran through about 1991.  This study has chosen that date 
as the demarcation.  Their data is provided, and in some cases, linear regression 
lines are fit to the data. 
Next the post-Cold War data (after 1991) are provided in the same format.  
This is followed by a comparison of the two sets of data to determine if there is 
significant difference between them.  Finally, other observations relating to the 
                                            
26 Jones and Bixler, 85. 
12
data are presented.  These observations are not necessarily related to the main 
research question and raise interesting possibilities for further study. 
B. CONTROLLING THROUGH LEGISLATION 
Jones and Bixler state that one way Congress controls Defense spending 
is through annual authorization and appropriation legislation. 27  They suggest 
that the length and complexity of the legislation is indicative of control.  These 
dimensions are measured by page count, number of amendments, and number 
of general provisions.  Specifically, these measures include: the number of pages 
in the annual Defense authorization and appropriation bills, the number of pages 
in the annual HASC and SASC reports, the number of pages in the annual 
Defense appropriation committee reports (House and Senate versions), the 
number of amendments to the annual Defense authorization and appropriation 
bills, and the number of general provisions within the annual Defense 
appropriation bills. 
1. Pages in the Defense Authorization Bills 
 Table 1 shows the number of pages in the Defense authorization bills for 
the years 1963 through 2007.  Figure 1 displays this data on a scatter plot and 
contains two regression lines, one for the Cold War data and one for the post-











                                             
27 Jones and Bixler, 45. 
13
Table 1.   Number of Pages in the Defense Authorization Bills 
(Fiscal Years 1963-2007) 
Fiscal Year Pages Fiscal Year Pages Fiscal Year Pages 
1963 1 1978 17 1993 524 
1964 2 1979 19 1994 421 
1965 1 1980 19 1995 452 
1966 3 1981 47 1996 519 
1967 5 1982 36 1997 450 
1968 3 1983 46 1998 450 
1969 4 1984 95 1999 359 
1970 10 1985 170 2000 465 
1971 10 1986 197 2001 515 
1972 9 1987 265 2002 382 
1973 7 1988 230 2003 306 
1974 19 1989 285 2004 435 
1975 11 1990 339 2005 389 
1976 16 1991 371 2006 423 
1977 15 1992 351 2007 439 
 
Sources:  For Fiscal Year 1963 through Fiscal Year 1991, adapted from Jones and Bixler (1992, p.49). For 




(Fiscal Years 1963-2007) 














Slope = -2.982 / year 
R squared = 0.053 
1963-1991 Regression Line
Slope = 10.967 / year 
R squared = 0.666 
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a. Cold War Data  
  Jones and Bixler comment that there is an increase in the number 
of pages in the Defense authorization legislation during the Cold War era.28  The 
slope of the linear regression line supports this statement by showing that on 
average the Defense authorization bill grow by nearly 11 pages per year during 
that timeframe.  The relatively high R squared value of 0.67 suggests that the 
pattern is fairly linear, but upon closer examination, it appears the relationship is 
more exponential than linear. 
b. Post-Cold War Data 
  The data from the post-Cold War era (1992-2007) is very sporadic 
with a range from 306 to 524 and a mean of 430 pages.  On average, the size of 
the Defense authorization bill decreased by nearly 3 pages per year...A 
regression resulted in an R squared value of only 0.05 from which we can infer 
there is no linear relationship between the numbers of pages in the authorization 
bills during those years. 
c. Cold War / Post-Cold War Comparison 
  The most significant difference between the Cold War data and the 
post-Cold War data is the clarity of the trend.  While the year-to-year pattern in 
the Cold War data is not constant, at least the vast majority of these years show 
some sort of increase.  The post-Cold War years, on the other hand, show a 
seemingly sporadic arrangement of data with eight years of increased page 
count, six years of decreased page count, and one year remaining the same.  
Therefore, the Cold War trends of increasing page counts do not continue in the 
post-Cold War.  With that said, there does seem to be something interesting 
going on in the data.  Figure 1 shows two separate equilibriums for the numbers 
of pages in the Defense authorization bills.  The first equilibrium spans twenty 
one years, 1963-1983, and has a mean of approximately 14 pages.  The other 
equilibrium spans 15 years, 1993-2007, and has a mean of approximately 435 
pages.  The decade, 1983-1993, that separates these two equilibriums nearly 
averages a 48-page increase per year.  This information poses some interesting 
                                            
28 Jones and Bixler, 49. 
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questions.  For instance, what caused this ten-year run of substantial growth in 
the Defense authorization bills?  Was it at this point that Congress realized that 
earmarking was a management tool they could use?  Why did this high rate of 
increase eventually level off?  Is it based on the idea that preparing a document 
through coordination and debate with so many people can establish some sort of 
arbitrary limit on the size of the document? 
2. Pages in the Defense Appropriation Bills 
 Table 2 shows the number of pages in the Defense appropriation bills for 
the years 1963 through 2007.  Figure 2 displays this data on a scatter plot and 
contains two regression lines, one for the Cold War data and one for the post-
Cold War data. 
 
Table 2.   Number of Pages in the Defense Appropriation Bills 
(Fiscal Years 1963-2007) 
Fiscal Year Pages Fiscal Year Pages Fiscal Year Pages 
1963 18 1978 26 1993 72 
1964 17 1979 25 1994 67 
1965 17 1980 27 1995 62 
1966 18 1981 28 1996 46 
1967 19 1982 30 1997 50* 
1968 19 1983 34 1998 49 
1969 18 1984 39 1999 64 
1970 19 1985 68 2000 73 
1971 19 1986 40 2001 55 
1972 20 1987 98 2002 61** 
1973 21 1988 47 2003 59 
1974 21 1989 61 2004 56 
1975 22 1990 47 2005 65 
1976 27 1991 59 2006 60*** 
1977 23 1992 68 2007 60 
 
Sources: For Fiscal Year 1963 through Fiscal Year 1991, adapted from Jones and Bixler (1992, p.49). 
For Fiscal Year 1992 through 2007, Thomas Library of Congress website archive of 
Defense appropriation bills. 
Notes:  * The 1997 Defense Appropriation Bill contains 750 total pages; however, only 50 pages are 
applicable to Defense. 
** The 2002 Defense Appropriation Bill contains 126 total pages; however, only 61 pages are 
applicable to Defense. 
*** The 2006 Defense Appropriation Bill contains 153 total pages; however, only 60 pages are 




(Fiscal Years 1963-2007) 
Figure 2.   Number of Pages in the Defense Appropriation Bills 
 
a. Cold War Data  
  Figure 2 shows a clear trend of increasing pages in the Defense 
appropriation bills during the Cold War era.  Jones and Bixler state that they feel 
the trend reflects a “steady increase” in appropriation legislation during the 
period.29  The slope of the regression line shows that on average the page count 
in the annual Defense appropriation bills grew more than 1.7 pages per year, and 
the R squared value of nearly 0.6 shows that it did so in a fairly linear manner.  
While this growth rate is much smaller than the increase observed in the Defense 
authorization bills during the same period, it is still very significant based on the 
fact that the Defense appropriation bills more than tripled in less than 30 years. 
b. Post-Cold War Data 
  The 1992-2007 data does not resemble a linear pattern.  A 
negative regression slope and an R squared value of only 0.025 support this 
observation.  The data shows six years of increase, eight years of decrease, and  
 
                                            













Slope = 1.735 / year 
R squared = 0.597 
1992-2007 Regression Line 
Slope = -0.263 / year 
R squared = 0.025 
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one year of no change in the number of pages in the Defense appropriation bills.  
The post-Cold War data ranged from 46 pages in 1996 to 72 pages in 1993 with 
an overall average of approximately 60 pages. 
c. Cold War / Post-Cold War Comparison 
  The Cold War pattern of increasing page count in the annual 
Defense appropriation bills no longer exists in the post-Cold War era.  However, 
Figure 2 shows a new pattern in the post-Cold War data.  The first 1992-2000 
portion of the post-Cold War data has an average residual length of 6.3 pages 
while the corresponding value for 2001-2007 timeframe is only 3.2 pages.  This 
can be seen in Figure 3 by the way the data are surrounding and converging on 
the regression line in the later half of the post-Cold War era.  This poses some 
interesting questions.  For instance, why are the numbers of pages in the annual 
Defense appropriation bills converging on a single value (approximately 60 
pages)?  Has some higher levels of authority determined that this is the optimal 
value and the boundaries of deviation from this value are continuing to be 
tightened? 
3. Pages in the HASC Reports on Defense Authorization Bills 
 Table 3 shows the number of pages in the House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC) reports on Defense authorization bills for the years 1969 
through 2007.  Figure 3 displays this data on a scatter plot and contains two 
regression lines, one for the Cold War data and one for the post-Cold War data.  
Due to time and resource constraints, the author was unable to attain the 










Table 3.   Number of Pages in the House Armed Services Committee Reports 
on Defense Authorization Bills 
(Fiscal Years 1969-1991, 1996-2007) 
Fiscal Year Pages Fiscal Year Pages Fiscal Year Pages 
1969 91 1982 228 1995 N/A 
1970 176 1983 233 1996 584 
1971 95 1984 332 1997 745 
1972 107 1985 399 1998 803 
1973 115 1986 431 1999 602 
1974 132 1987 272 2000 730 
1975 132 1988 399 2001 725 
1976 185 1989 486 2002 740 
1977 169 1990 549 2003 612 
1978 150 1991 670 2004 552 
1979 163 1992 N/A 2005 497 
1980 186 1993 N/A 2006 552 
1981 171 1994 N/A 2007 712 
 
Sources: For Fiscal Year 1969 through Fiscal Year 1991, adapted from Jones and Bixler (1992, p.64). 
For Fiscal Year 1996 through 2007, House Armed Services Committee website archive of 
committee reports. 
Note:  Author was not able to attain data for Fiscal Years 1992-1995. 
 
 
(Fiscal Years 1969-1991, 1996-2007) 
Figure 3.   Number of Pages in the House Armed Services Committee Reports 























































1996-2007 Regression Line 
Slope = -10.699 / year 
R squared = 0.153 
1969-1991 Regression Line
Slope = 20.875 / year 
R squared = 0.779 
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a. Cold War Data  
  Figure 3 shows that the Cold War data has a trend that is 
substantially increasing.  This is in agreement with Jones and Bilxer’s findings. 30  
Comparing the 1969 HASC report to the 1991 HASC report shows that the page 
length grew by more than a factor of seven.  The average rate of increase in 
page count in the HASC reports was over 20 pages per year during this time 
period.  The R squared value of .779 reflects the fact that the pages were 
increasing in a fairly linear manner.   
b. Post-Cold War Data 
  The post-Cold War information in Table 3 and Figure 3 are 
represented by the data for fiscal years 1996 through 2007.  The negative 
regression slope in Figure 3 shows that on average the number of pages in the 
HASC reports was decreasing by over ten pages per year during the post-Cold 
War era.  However, the fairly small R squared value of 0.153 supports the 
observation that the data does not seem to be decreasing in a linear manner.  
Instead, the data looks to be relatively sporadic with maximum, minimum, and 
average page counts of 803, 497, and 655 respectively. 
c. Cold War / Post-Cold War Comparison 
  Figure 3 shows that the relatively consistent and linear increase in 
HASC reports page count that took place in the Cold War era does not exist in 
the post-Cold War era.  This can be seen in the average rate reduction between 
periods; specifically, going from an increase of over 20 pages per year to 
decreasing by over 10 pages per year.  Another interesting observation is that 
the average residual length from 1969 to 1990 is approximately 50 pages, but the 
corresponding value from 1996 to 2007 is more than 80 pages.  This is why the 





                                            
30 Jones and Bixler, 63. 
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4. Pages in the SASC Reports on Defense Authorization Bills 
 Table 4 shows the number of pages in the Senate Armed Services 
Committee (SASC) reports on Defense authorization bills for the years 1969 
through 2007.  Figure 4 displays this data on a scatter plot and contains two 
regression lines, one for the Cold War data and one for the post-Cold War data.  
Due to time and resource constraints, the author was unable to attain the 
applicable data for the fiscal years 1992 through 1995. 
 
Table 4.   Number of Pages in the Senate Armed Services Committee Reports 
on Defense Authorization Bills 
(Fiscal Years 1969-1991, 1996-2007) 
Fiscal Year Pages Fiscal Year Pages Fiscal Year Pages 
1969 31 1982 197 1995 N/A 
1970 70 1983 222 1996 441 
1971 121 1984 432 1997 473 
1972 140 1985 489 1998 490 
1973 177 1986 309 1999 477 
1974 205 1987 296 2000 507 
1975 190 1988 228 2001 470* 
1976 191 1989 194 2002 502 
1977 204 1990 297 2003 515 
1978 153 1991 373 2004 488 
1979 158 1992 N/A 2005 512 
1980 166 1993 N/A 2006 514 
1981 242 1994 N/A 2007 551 
 
Sources: For Fiscal Year 1969 through Fiscal Year 1991, adapted from Jones and Bixler (1992, 
p.64). For Fiscal Year 1996 through 2007, Senate Armed Services Committee website 
archive of committee reports. 
Notes: * The 2001 Senate Armed Services Report contains an additional 513 pages of minority views 
from Senator McCain. 










(Fiscal Years 1969-1991, 1996-2007) 
Figure 4.   Number of Pages in the Senate Armed Services Committee Reports 
on Defense Authorization Bills 
 
a. Cold War Data  
  Figure 4 shows that the Cold War data has an increasing trend.  
Jones and Bixler also comment on this trend of page count growth. 31  On 
average, the number of pages in the SASC reports grew by more than 11 pages 
per year during the 1969-1991 timeframe.  Overall, an R squared value of greater 
than 0.5 reflects the notion that the pages were increasing in a fairly linear 
manner during the Cold War era.  The data holds a relatively clear pattern during 
1969-1983 timeframe with an average residual length of approximately 33 pages.  
However, during the 1984-1991 timeframe the average residual length increased 
to 85 pages which results in great diminishment of clarity of any linear-like 
pattern. 
b. Post-Cold War Data 
  Figure 4 shows that the post-Cold War data increases at an 
average rate of approximately 6.4 pages per year.  All the data points are in a 
                                            





















































Slope = 11.398 / year 
R squared = 0.522 1996-2007 Regression Line
Slope = 6.448 / year 
R squared = 0.675 
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very close approximation to the regression line.  The R squared is very high, 
0.675, and supports the observation that each the residual lengths are relatively 
small.  Therefore the trend appears to be increasing at a fairly stable rate. 
c. Cold War / Post-Cold War Comparison 
  The trend of page count increase in the SASC reports on DoD 
authorizations has changed little since the Cold War era.  Both the Cold War and 
post-Cold War trends are increasing, but the average rate of increase in the post-
Cold War era has slowed to less than 60 percent of that observed in the Cold 
War era.  Another interesting observation is that the average residual length 
observed during the Cold War era is more than 51 pages while the post-Cold 
War data only averages a length of 13 pages.  That is a nearly a 75 percent 
reduction in variability from the Cold War to the post-Cold War data set.  This 
poses some interesting question.  For instance, have higher levels of authority 
determined an optimal rate of annual page increase for the annual SASC 
reports?  If so, have they established limits of deviation from this rate as well as a 
method to control and ensure these limits are not breached? 
5. Pages in the HAC Reports on Defense Appropriation Bills 
 Table 5 shows the number of pages in the House Appropriations 
Committee (HAC) reports on Defense appropriation bills for the years 1968 
through 2007.  Figure 5 displays this data on a scatter plot and contains two 
regression lines, one for the Cold War data and one for the post-Cold War data.  
Due to time and resource constraints, the author was unable to attain the 














Table 5.   Number of Pages in the House Appropriations Committee Reports on 
Defense Appropriation Bills 
(Fiscal Years 1968-1991, 1996-2007) 
Fiscal Year Pages Fiscal Year Pages 
1968 67 1988 307 
1969 68 1989 223 
1970 102 1990 251 
1971 119 1991 273 
1972 139 1992 N/A 
1973 256 1993 N/A 
1974 239 1994 N/A 
1975 171 1995 N/A 
1976 358 1996 229 
1977 226 1997 259 
1978 387 1998 292 
1979 446 1999 315 
1980 493 2000 269 
1981 398 2001 237 
1982 315 2002 379 
1983 259 2003 382 
1984 298 2004 341 
1985 299 2005 427 
1986 401 2006 367 
1987 324 2007 351 
 
Sources: For Fiscal Year 1968 through Fiscal Year 1991, adapted 
from Jones and Bixler (1992, p.65). For Fiscal Year 1996 
through 2007, Thomas Library of Congress website 
archive of Appropriations committees’ reports. 





(Fiscal Years 1968-1991, 1996-2007) 
Figure 5.   Number of Pages in the House Appropriations Committee Reports on 
Defense Appropriation Bills 
 
a. Cold War Data  
  Jones and Bixler graphically suggest that the number of pages in 
the annual HAC reports were increasing in the Cold War era.32  By increasing 
nearly 9 pages per year, the slope of the regression line during this time period 
supports their findings.  However, the variation from year to year is often large 
based on a relatively insignificant R squared value of 0.292 and a large average 
residual length of nearly 80 pages. 
b. Post-Cold War Data 
  Figure 5 shows that the page counts in the HAC reports increased 
an average of over 13 pages per year during the post-Cold War timeframe.  The 
corresponding R squared value of 0.586 and an average residual length of only 
33 pages support the notion that the increase was fairly linear. 
                                            












































1968-1991 Regression Line 
Slope = 8.857 / year 
R squared = 0.292 
1996-2007 Regression Line 
Slope = 13.531 / year 
R squared = 0.586 
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c. Cold War / Post-Cold War Comparison 
  The slopes of the regressions lines in each time period show that 
the page count during the Cold War and post Cold War eras were increasing at 
fairly similar rates.  Based on this information alone, it would appear that the 
post-Cold War trends were consistent with those of the Cold War timeframe.  
However, the average length of the residuals observed during the Cold War era 
is nearly 2.5 times larger than those observed in the post-Cold War era.  This 
might suggest that some sort of variation control is more prominent in the post-
Cold War era. 
An interesting observation that can be seen in Figure 5 is that there 
was a dramatic increase in page count during the years 1968-1980.  Then the 
page count averaged a decrease of more than 14 pages per year over the 
following decade.  By 1996 the average page count was increasing again.  
Therefore, it seems like there was more than one major shift in the data.  Earlier 
comments in this thesis discussed possible reasons for the second shift, the end 
of the Cold War.  What was the reason for the shift in slope observed around 
1980? 
Another observation that can be seen in Figure 5 is that there does 
not appear to be any clear linear pattern within the data ranging from 1973 to 
2007.  Running a linear regression over the time period supports this observation 
by resulting in an increasing slope that is smaller than one page per year and an 
insignificant R squared value of less than 0.016.  This suggests that the page 
count during this period was either sporadic or possibly followed some other non-
linear trend that does not appear to be obvious in the Figure 5. 
6. Pages in the SAC Reports on Defense Appropriation Bills 
 Table 6 shows the number of pages in the Senate Appropriations 
Committee (SAC) reports on Defense appropriation bills for the years 1968 
through 2007.  Figure 6 displays this data on a scatter plot and contains two 
regression lines, one for the Cold War data and one for the post-Cold War data.  
Due to time and resource constraints, the author was unable to attain the 






Table 6.   Number of Pages in the Senate Appropriations Committee Reports 
on Defense Appropriation Bills 
(Fiscal Years 1968-1991, 1996-2007) 
Fiscal Year Pages Fiscal Year Pages 
1968 71 1988 353 
1969 56 1989 311 
1970 141 1990 343 
1971 221 1991 274 
1972 210 1992 N/A 
1973 204 1993 N/A 
1974 173 1994 N/A 
1975 207 1995 N/A 
1976 302 1996 221 
1977 277 1997 165 
1978 295 1998 159 
1979 217 1999 163 
1980 219 2000 151 
1981 227 2001 160 
1982 137 2002 234 
1983 157 2003 244 
1984 205 2004 201 
1985 227 2005 213 
1986 363 2006 274 
1987 373 2007 253 
 
Sources: For Fiscal Year 1968 through Fiscal Year 1991, adapted from 
Jones and Bixler (1992, p.65). For Fiscal Year 1996 through 
2007, Thomas Library of Congress website archive of 
Appropriations committees’ reports. 







(Fiscal Years 1968-1991, 1996-2007) 
Figure 6.   Number of Pages in the Senate Appropriations Committee Reports 
on Defense Appropriation Bills 
 
a. Cold War Data  
  Jones and Bixler suggest an increasing trend in the number of 
pages in the SAC reports during the 1968-1991 timeframe.33  Figure 6 supports 
their findings by showing an average increase of over eight pages per year 
during that time.  The Cold War data have an average residual length of 52, but 
the R squared value of 0.48 suggests that the data is fairly linear. 
b. Post-Cold War Data 
  Figure 6 shows that the data representing the post-Cold War era is 
increasing at an average rate of nearly eight pages per year.  The data have an 
average residual length of 26 pages, and the R squared value of 0.44 suggests 
that the data is relatively linear. 
 
 
                                            












































1968-1991 Regression Line 
Slope = 8.410 / year 
R squared = 0.480 
1996-2007 Regression Line 
Slope = 7.881 / year 
R squared = 0.441 
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c. Cold War / Post-Cold War Comparison 
  The fact that both sets of data in Figure 6 show an average annual 
increase of approximately eight pages per year might suggest that the trend is 
continuous throughout the entire data set.  However this is not the case.  Notice 
that the Cold War regression line has a value of approximately 330 pages in 
1991 while the post-Cold War regression line has a value close to 160 pages in 
1996.  It is plausible to assume there must have been a large reduction shift in 
the early 1990s.  However, there could be another explanation for this.  Maybe 
the data does not show two fairly clear patterns after all.  Instead, perhaps there 
is no discernable pattern in the data at all.  For example, when only looking at the 
1972-2007 data, it appears that there is not any significant trend.  This is 
supported by a decreasing linear regression slope of only half a page per year 
and a very insignificant R squared value of 0.01.  Likewise, if there was an 
increasing pattern throughout the entire data set, it would highly unlikely that the 
number of pages in the SAC reports for the years 1973, 1984, and 2004 would 
be within four pages of each other. 
7. Amendments to the Defense Authorization and Appropriation 
Bills 
 Table 7 and Figure 7 show the number of amendments to the annual 
Defense authorization and appropriation bills during the Cold War era.  Due to 
time and resource constraints the Cold War data is limited to fiscal years 1982 
to1990.  The post-Cold War data encompasses 1992 to 2007 and is shown Table 
8 and Figure 8.  The reason the Cold War data and post-Cold War data are 
shown separately is because there is good reason to believe that the numeric 
values within the Cold War data do not correspond to the numeric values within 
the post-Cold War data.  This could be caused by using different data definitions.  







Table 7.   Number of Amendments to the Defense Authorization and 
Appropriation Bills 
(Fiscal Years 1982-1990) 











Source: adapted from Jones and Bixler (1992, p.54) 
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Slope = 9.683 / year 
R squared = 0.297 
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a. Cold War Data  
  Figure 7 shows that the number of amendments to the Defense 
authorization and appropriation bills increased at an average rate of nearly ten 
per year during the 1982-1991 timeframe.  The R squared value of approximately 
0.3 is fairly insignificant.  The average residual length for the data is 
approximately 29 amendments which is 17 percent of the average number of 
amendments each year. 
 
Table 8.   Number of Amendments to the Defense Authorization and 
Appropriation Bills 
(Fiscal Years 1992-2007) 


















Source: Thomas Library of Congress website archive of 









(Fiscal Years 1992-2007) 
Figure 8.   Number of Amendments to the Defense Authorization and 
Appropriation Bills 
 
b. Post-Cold War Data 
  Figure 8 shows that the number of amendments to the Defense 
authorization and appropriation bills increased at an average rate of more than 
nine per year during the 1992-2007 timeframe.  However, the 2002 outlier of 485 
amendments has significant pull on the regression line.  2002, however wasn’t 
the only year that shows significant change in amendment count.  For instance, 
the number of amendments decreased by almost 80 percent from 1995 to 1996 
and increased by more than 850 percent from 1999 to 2000.  Therefore, the 
average trend of increasing amendment count throughout the period is by no 
means consistent on a year-to-year basis.  These are some of reasons the R 
squared value of 0.145 is so insignificant.  Furthermore, this variation shows up 
in the average residual length of 64 which translates into more than 50 percent of 






















Slope = 9.044 / year 
R squared = 0.145 
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c. Cold War / Post-Cold War Comparison 
  The rates of amendment count growth within the Defense 
authorization and appropriation bills in the Cold War and post-Cold War data are 
very similar.  Both data sets show an average amendment increase of 
approximately nine per year.  Likewise, the specific patterns within the two eras 
are not overly dissimilar.  This biggest difference is in variation.  The post-Cold 
War data has an average residual, as a percentage of average amendment 
count, value that is nearly three times higher than that of the Cold War era.  
Much of this difference, however, is attributed to the 2002 outlier of 485 
amendments.  Therefore, it appears that there is no notably significant change 
between the Cold War and post-Cold War trends. 
8. General Provisions in the Defense Appropriation Bills 
 Table 9 shows the number of general provisions in the Defense 
appropriation bills for the years 1976 through 2007.  Figure 9 displays this data 
on a scatter plot and contains two regression lines, one for the Cold War data 

















Table 9.   Number of General Provisions in the Defense Appropriation Bills 
(Fiscal Years 1976-2007) 
Fiscal Year General Provisions Fiscal Year General Provisions 
1976 96 1992 157 
1977 87 1993 168 
1978 101 1994 156 
1979 109 1995 158 
1980 125 1996 130 
1981 138 1997 138 
1982 158 1998 132 
1983 183 1999 148 
1984 217 2000 176 
1985 213 2001 166 
1986 227 2002 173 
1987 236 2003 150 
1988 158 2004 141 
1989 185 2005 142 
1990 180 2006 129 
1991 237 2007 112 
 
Sources: For Fiscal Year 1976 through Fiscal Year 1991, adapted from Jones and Bixler (1992, p.78). 
For Fiscal Year 1991 through 2007, Thomas Library of Congress website archive of Defense 
appropriation bills. 
 
Figure 9.   Number of General Provisions in the Defense Appropriation Bills 









































Slope = 8.985 / year 
R squared = 0.677 1992-2007 Regression Line 
Slope = -1.535 / year 
R squared = 0.167 
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a. Cold War Data  
  Figure 9 shows that on average the number of general provisions in 
the Defense appropriation bills increased by nearly nine per year during the 
1976-1991 timeframe.  Jones and Bilxer comment on the increase by describing 
it as a “proliferation.” 34  The data has an R squared value of 0.677 which 
suggests that the numbers of general provisions are increasing in a relatively 
linear manner. 
b. Post-Cold War Data 
  The post-Cold War data shows that on average the number of 
general provisions in Defense appropriation bills decreased by approximately 1.5 
per year during the 1992-2007 timeframe.  The corresponding R squared value 
of 0.167 implies that the decreasing trend is not very linear.  By observing Figure 
9, it appears that around 1997 there is a shift from a decreasing number of 
provisions to an increasing number of provisions.  Then around 2002 it shifts 
back to a decreasing trend. 
c. Cold War / Post-Cold War Comparison 
  The large difference in the value of regression line slopes between 
the Cold War and post-Cold War data suggests that a change has definitely 
occurred.  The trend of the Cold War era is not continued during the post-Cold 
War era.  However, there is an additional observation that can be seen in Figure 
9.  It appears that the end of the Cold War, 1991, is not when the change took 
place.  Instead, when observing all the data as a whole, it seems that there were 
several shifting points.  The trend was increasing until approximately 1987, when 
it shifted to a decreasing pattern.  The trend continued to decrease over the next 
decade until it began to increase again around 1997.  It increased until 
approximately 2001, when it shifted back to a decreasing pattern that continues 
to be observed in 2007.  This poses questions related to the causes of these 
shifts in slope.  What specific event(s) took place during these periods of 
changing slope that affected the number of general provisions within the 
appropriation bills?  
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C. CONTROLLING THROUGH INFORMATION GATHERING 
 Jones and Bixler suggest that another way Congress controls Defense 
spending is through information gathering.  They state that measuring the 
amount of Defense-related Congressional hearings and analyzing the makeup of 
the witnesses to these hearings are a few methods for determining the level of 
Congressional control.35  Jones and Bixler’s specific measures are the number of 
annual hearings before the HASC, number of annual hearings before the SASC, 
and the percentage witnesses that attend HASC hearings that are DoD 
personnel, non-DoD government personnel, and lobbyists / special interest 
groups. 
1. Hearings before the HASC 
 Table 10 shows the number of hearings held annually by the House 
Armed Services Committee for the years 1966 through 1972 and 1997 through 
2006.  Note that the Cold War data is represented by the 1966 to 1972 sample 
while the post-Cold War data is represented by the 1997 to 2006 sample.  Figure 
10 displays both sets of data on a single scatter plot.  Data samples of such 
small size do not promote reliable regression analysis within each time period.  
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Table 10.   Number of Hearings Held by the House Armed Services Committee 
(Fiscal Years 1966-1972, 1997-2006) 
Fiscal Year Hearings Fiscal Year Hearings 
1966 17 1997 69 
1967 17 1998 61 
1968 11 1999 77 
1969 26 2000 57 
1970 26 2001 52 
1971 30 2002 64 
1972 30 2003 65 
  2004 92 
  2005 79 
  2006 77* 
 
Sources: For Fiscal Year 1966 through Fiscal Year 1972, adapted from 
Jones and Bixler (1992, p.72). For Fiscal Year 1997 through 2006, 
House Armed Services Committee website archive of hearings 
schedules. 
Note: * Any 2006 hearings that took place after 17 Nov. 2006 are not 
included in this number. 
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a. Cold War Data  
  The HASC averaged approximately 22 hearings per year during the 
1966-1972 timeframe.  Figure 10 shows an increasing trend in the number of 
hearings per year, nearly twofold from 17 to 30. 
b. Post-Cold War Data 
  The HASC averaged nearly 70 hearings per year during the 1997-
2006 timeframe.  Figure 10 suggests that the average trend in the number of 
hearings per year is increasing within this time period, but there is variation 
ranging from 52 to 79. 
c. Cold War / Post-Cold War Comparison 
  Figure 10 shows that there was a dramatic increase in the number 
of hearings held by the HASC between the two sets of data.  The average 
number of hearings in the post-Cold War data is more than triple that of the Cold 
War data.  This poses some interesting questions.  For example, how do the 
average number of days spent in hearings compare between time periods?  
Jones and Bixler tracked that information for a short period within the Cold War 
era.  Unfortunately, the corresponding post-Cold War data was not accessible.  It 
is conceivable that the Cold War hearings were longer because more topics were 
covered within each hearing compared to hearings in the post-Cold War era. 
  Another way to test this theory could be to compare the number of 
witnesses per hearing for each time period.  Table 11 and Figure 11 contain this 
information.  The numbers of witnesses per hearing in 1966-1972 are 
substantially higher than those observed in 1997-2006.  The 1966-1972 average 
was greater than 14 witnesses per hearing while the 1997-2006 average was 
only 4.5 witnesses per hearing.  Figure 11 shows this difference on a scatter plot.  
Notice how Figure 11 and Figure 10 appear to be inverses of each other.  
Comparing the two shows that as the number of HASC hearings increased, the 
number of witnesses per hearing decreased.  What did remain similar, however, 
was the average number of witnesses per year throughout the Cold War and 
post-Cold War data; 303 and 310 respectively.  This might suggests that the 
HASC is focusing on a greater number of specific issues; which is indicative of 
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higher oversight.  It could also mean that the HASC is becoming more 
decentralized, allowing subcommittees to handle issues that used to be covered 
within the full committee hearings.  These speculations should be examined in 
further study. 
Table 11.   Number of Witnesses per House Armed Services Committee Hearing 
(Fiscal Years 1966-1972, 1997-2006) 
Fiscal Year Witnesses / Hearing Fiscal Year 
Witnesses / 
Hearing 
1966 17.6 1997 5.2 
1967 19.8 1998 4.6 
1968 14.9 1999 5.6 
1969 8.3 2000 4.8 
1970 12.5 2001 5.2 
1971 15.5 2002 4.3 
1972 10.5 2003 3.4 
  2004 4.0 
  2005 3.9 
  2006 4.1 
 
Sources: For Fiscal Year 1966 through Fiscal Year 1972, derived from Jones and Bixler (1992, 
pp.72, 75). For Fiscal Year 1997 through 2006, House Armed Services Committee 
website archive of hearings schedules.  
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2. Hearings Before the SASC 
 Table 12 shows the number of hearings held annually by the Senate 
Armed Services Committee for the years 1966 through 1972 and 1999 through 
2006.  Note that the Cold War data is represented by the 1966 to 1972 sample 
while the post-Cold War data is represented by the 1999 to 2006 sample.  Figure 
12 displays both sets of data on a single scatter plot.  Data samples of such 
small size don’t promote reliable regression analysis within each time period.  
However, by comparing other measures of analysis, additional observations are 
made. 
 
Table 12.   Number of Hearings Held by the Senate Armed Services Committee 
(Fiscal Years 1966-1972, 1999-2006) 
Fiscal Year Hearings Fiscal Year Hearings 
1966 24 1999 78 
1967 20 2000 58 
1968 15 2001 68 
1969 18 2002 56 
1970 17 2003 57 
1971 20 2004 65 
1972 19 2005 62 
  2006 46 
 
Sources: For Fiscal Year 1966 through Fiscal Year 1972, adapted from 
Jones and Bixler (1992, p.72). For Fiscal Year 1999 through 2006, 














(Fiscal Years 1966-1972, 1999-2006) 
Figure 12.   Number of Hearings Held by the Senate Armed Services Committee 
 
a. Cold War Data  
  The SASC averaged approximately 19 hearings per year during the 
1966-1972 timeframe.  Figure 12 does not show a clear trend, increasing or 
decreasing, during this period of time. 
b. Post-Cold War Data 
  The SASC averaged more than 61 hearings per year during the 
1999-2006 timeframe.  Figure 12 suggests that the average trend in the number 
of hearings per year is decreasing within this time period from a high of 78 to a 
low of 46. 
c. Cold War / Post-Cold War Comparison 
  Figure 12 shows that there was a dramatic increase in the number 
of hearings held by the SASC between the two sets of data.  The average 
number of hearings in the post-Cold War data is more than triple that of the Cold 

















  However, this information should not stand alone.  If the trends in 
the number of witnesses per SASC hearing are similar to that of the HASC 
hearings, then the same type of inquiries are applicable.  Likewise, the average 
length of each SASC hearing should be examined in further study. 
3. Composition of Witnesses in the HASC Hearings 
 Table 13 shows the composition of witnesses as percentages within 
HASC hearings for the years 1966 through 1972 and 1997 through 2006.  Note 
that the Cold War data is represented by the 1966 to 1972 sample while the post-
Cold War data is represented by the 1997 to 2006 sample.  Figure 13 displays 
both sets of data on a single scatter plot. 
 
Table 13.   Composition of Witnesses in the House Armed Services Committee 
Hearings 
(Fiscal Years 1966-1972, 1997-2006) 
Fiscal Year DoD Non-DoD Govt Lobbyists / SIGs 
1966 52%   35%   13%   
1967 55% Average 20% Average 24% Average 
1968 82% 63% 10% 21% 8% 16% 
1969 69%   22%   9%   
1970 62% Range 21% Range 18% Range 
1971 48% 34% 19% 25% 33% 26% 
1972 74%   18%   7%   
1997 58%   20%   22%   
1998 63%   15%   21%   
1999 68% Average 13% Average 19% Average 
2000 61% 64% 15% 15% 24% 21% 
2001 61%   15%   24%   
2002 48% Range 10% Range 42% Range 
2003 72% 25% 10% 14% 18% 31% 
2004 73%   13%   14%   
2005 70%   19%   11%   
2006 64%   24%   12%   
 
Sources: For Fiscal Year 1966 through Fiscal Year 1972, derived from Jones and Bixler (1992, p.75). For 
Fiscal Year 1997 through 2006, derived from House Armed Services Committee website archive of 
hearings schedules. 
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Figure 13.   Composition of Witnesses in the House Armed Services Committee 
Hearings 
 
a. Cold War Data  
  Figure 13 shows that for each year in the 1966-1972 timeframe a 
large percentage of witnesses in HASC hearings were DoD personnel ranging 
from 48 percent in 1971 to 82 percent in 1968 with an average of 63 percent over 
the period.  The average percentage of non-DoD Government employees that 
were HASC hearing witnesses was 21 percent while the lobbyists and special 
interests groups composed of 16 percent of the witnesses during this timeframe. 
b. Post-Cold War Data 
  A large percentage of witnesses in HASC hearings were DoD 
personnel ranging from 48 percent in 2002 to 73 percent in 2004 with an average 
of 64 percent over the 1997-2006 timeframe.  Non-DoD Government employees 
that were HASC witnesses represented an average composition of 15 percent 
while Lobbyists and special interests groups made up the remaining 21 percent 
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c. Cold War / Post-Cold War Comparison 
  Jones and Bixler suggested that Congress is using a broader base 
of witnesses to get, what some may consider, a clearer picture of information 
related to Defense spending.36  The data shows that the amount of HASC 
witnesses that were DoD employees in the post-Cold War data, 64 percent, 
remain fairly consistent with those in Cold War data, 63 percent.  Therefore, from 
a percentage standpoint, the HASC does not seem to be increasing the amount 
of non-DoD witnesses within their hearings. 
  One interesting feature that becomes apparent when comparing the 
two time periods is that the average percentage of non-DoD Government 
witnesses and the average percentage of lobbyists and special interest groups 
seem to have swapped.  In the 1966-1972 timeframe the average percentage of 
non-DoD Government employees that were HASC hearing witnesses was 21 
percent while the lobbyists and special interests groups composed of 16 percent.  
However, the 1997-2006 data shows the average percentage of non-DoD 
Government employees that were HASC hearing witnesses was 15 percent while 
the lobbyists and special interests groups composed of 21 percent.  The 
reasoning for this exchange of witness type and its effects are beyond the realm 
of this thesis, however, should be considered for further study. 
D. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
 The purpose of this chapter was to analyze and compare Cold War and 
post-Cold War era data for specific indicators of Congressional control of 
Defense spending to determine if there is a difference in the levels and trends of 
Congressional control from period to period.  Two of the ways that Congress 
controls Defense spending are through verbiage in legislation and by gathering 
information. 37  Jones and Bixler describe several pieces of specific legislation as 
well as particular methodologies to measure the level of Congressional control 
over Defense spending within the legislation.38  Within this chapter, Cold War and 
                                            
36 Jones and Bixler, 72. 
37 Ibid., 45, 71. 
38 Jones and Bixler, 45-54. 
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post-Cold War data for each piece of legislation described by Jones and Bixler 
were analyzed and compared.  Table 14 is a top-level summary of the 
information observed while analyzing and comparing the levels and trends from 
the Cold War to the post-Cold War era for each measure of legislation. 
 
Table 14.   Controlling Through Legislation; a Summary of Significant 
Observations in the Cold War to the Post-Cold War Comparison 
Measurements Observations 
Pages in Defense 
authorization bills 
• The increasing trend that existed during the Cold War era has not 
continued in the post-Cold War era. 
• Year-to-year variation is much larger in the post-Cold War era. 
Pages in Defense 
appropriation bills 
• The increasing trend that existed during the Cold War era has not 
continued in the post-Cold War era. 
• Year-to-year variation is much larger in the post-Cold War era. 
Pages in HASC reports 
• The increasing trend that existed during the Cold War era has not 
continued in the post-Cold War era. 
• Year-to-year variation is much larger in the post-Cold War era. 
Pages in SASC reports • The increasing trend that existed during the Cold War era has decelerated in the post-Cold War era. 
Pages in HAC reports • The Cold War and post-Cold War eras show increasing trends, but they are discontinuous. 
Pages in SAC reports • The Cold War and post-Cold War eras show increasing trends, but they are discontinuous. 
Amendments to 
Defense authorization 
and appropriation bills 
• There are no significant changes apparent. 
General provisions in 
Defense appropriation 
bills 
• The increasing trend that existed during the Cold War era has not 
continued in the post-Cold War era. 
 
 Table 14 lists several significant ways that the levels and trends observed 
in the methods Congress uses to control Defense spending through legislation 
during the Cold War era have significantly changed in the post-Cold War era.  
Seven of the eight measures show that the trends or levels observed in the Cold 
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War era are significantly different than those observed in the post-Cold War data.  
In most cases, the increasing levels and trends of Congressional control in the 
Cold War era have either leveled or rebaselined. 
 Three ways that Congress controls Defense spending through information 
gathering were analyzed to determine if significant change exist between the 
Cold War and the post-Cold War data.  The specific measurements and top-level 
observations from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era comparisons are 
displayed in Table 15. 
 
Table 15.   Controlling Through Information Gathering; a Summary of Significant 
Observations in the Cold War to the Post-Cold War Comparison 
Measurements Observations 
Hearings held by the HASC 
• The number of hearings in the Cold War era has tripled in 
the post-Cold War era.  However, the number of witness 
per hearing observed during the Cold War era is three 
times smaller in the post-Cold War era.  Therefore, the 
significance is undetermined. 
Hearings held by the SASC 
• The number of hearings in the Cold War era has tripled in 
the post-Cold War era.  However, the number of witness 
per hearing observed during the Cold War era is three 
times smaller in the post-Cold War era.  Therefore, the 
significance is undetermined. 
Composition of witnesses in 
HASC hearings 
• The trend of increasing non-DoD witnesses that existed in 
the Cold War era has not continued in the post-Cold War 
era. 
 
 Comparing the Cold War and post-Cold War data for the numbers of 
HASC hearings alone may result in misleading information related to the levels of 
Congressional control over Defense spending.  While the numbers of hearings 
have dramatically increased, the numbers of witnesses per hearing have 
decreased at nearly the same rate.  This suggests that a new structure for 
hearings has been implemented sometime after the 1972.  Without knowing the 
specific reasoning for this restructuring, any changes in the levels and trends of 
Congressional control are difficult to determine.  The author was unable to attain 
data for the number of SASC witnesses per hearing.  Understanding that 
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restructuring may have skewed this measurement also, speculations related to 
any change in Congressional control are undetermined here as well.  Therefore, 
even though there was a significant change in the annual numbers of HASC and 
SASC hearings, the effects on the levels and trends in Congressional control 
over Defense spending are undetermined. 
 Jones and Bixler suggest that Congress was using a broader base of 
witnesses to get a clearer picture of information related to Defense spending.39  
Since the amount of non-DoD HASC witnesses decreased by one percent from 
the Cold War-to the post Cold War averages, it appears the trend of using a 
broader base of witnesses has not continued, and therefore has changed. 
 
 Eleven of Jones and Bilxer’s measures of Congressional control were 
analyzed in this thesis.  Eight show strong indications of significant change in the 
levels or trends in Congressional control over Defense spending.  Therefore, it 
appears that the recent trends and levels observed in Congressional control of 
Defense spending have changed since the Cold War era. 
                                            




The goal of this thesis was to determine if the levels and trends in 
Congressional control of Defense spending observed in the Cold War era have 
continued in the post-Cold War era.  To answer this question, data reflecting the 
level of Congressional control from the Cold War and post-Cold War eras were 
obtained, compared and analyzed.  The results of the comparative analysis show 
that the levels and trends of Congressional control over Defense spending 
observed in the Cold War era have changed.  The general trend of increasing 
Congressional oversight observed during the Cold War era has ended.  It 
appears to have reached a plateau.  It seems as if Congress has reached 
maximum capacity to control Defense spending.  They manage Defense 
spending as much as they can, but they may have reached a level of control that 
can go no higher.  Complaints from Congress, dating back to 1948, suggest that 
there is an upper limit on the amount of control Congress can have over Defense 
spending. 40  The more Congress micromanages the DoD, the more work they 
make for themselves.  Therefore, since there is a maximum amount of work that 
Congress can do, there is a maximum amount oversight they can have over DoD 
spending. Trends in the data suggest they have reached their utmost level of 
oversight. 
B. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FURTHER STUDY 
One interesting observation is that the clarity of any pattern in many of the 
measures of Congressional control of Defense spending has substantially 
diminished from the clarity levels observed by Jones and Bixler in the Cold War 
data.  There does not seem to be any significant long-term pattern of increase or 
decrease.  Instead, many measures of control show substantial year-to-year 
variation that often differ from other measures of control.  It is as if Congress is 
                                            
40 Jones and Bixler, 51. 
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shifting their primary means of control from time to time.  Therefore, if Congress 
is at capacity, this suggests that the relevant question is no longer “how much” 
control.  Instead, the questions are “what form” of control, and “what influences 
the level of that form” of control. 
Figure 2 and Figure 9 seem to show cyclical patterns in the number of 
pages in the Defense appropriations bills and in the number of general provisions 
within the appropriation bills respectively.  What is the driving factor in these 
cycles?  Jones and Bixler noted some possible variables including public 
attitudes towards Defense spending, amount of DoD budget authority, amount of 
DoD spending, and the number of House and Senate employees41.  An 
additional driver that likely affects the level of Congressional oversight is party 
affiliation.  This includes the party affiliation of the presidential administration as 
well as which party is in the majority of the House and Senate.  Testing these 
variables was beyond the scope of this thesis but should be considered for 
further research.  With that said, a cursory look was made to determine whether 
variability in the level of Congressional control over Defense spending was tied to 
overall Defense spending and annual changes in Defense spending.  No 
significant correlation was found.  However, if the question is “what form” of 
control, there may be a multivariate relationship that is beyond the scope of this 
study. 
 Another interesting observation is the apparent restructuring of the HASC 
hearings.  Figure 11 and Figure 10 show that as the number of HASC hearings 
increased, the number of witnesses per hearing decreased.  This implies that the 
HASC is focusing on a greater number of specific issues; which is indicative of 
higher oversight.  It also suggests that the HASC is becoming more 
decentralized, allowing subcommittees to handle issues that used to be covered 
within the full committee hearings.  The possible reasoning is that information 
flow within large groups is often difficult.  Discussions get sidetracked, and points 
get lost or misinterpreted.  Hearings of smaller size often provide a better 
environment for information where many specific details can surface and be 
                                            
41 Jones and Bixler, 96-125. 
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covered in greater depth, which enables more and better quality oversight.  
Beyond my speculations, it would be interesting to understand why the HASC 
hearings have been restructured and the impact of this restructuring on 
Congressional oversight of Defense.  This should be considered for further study.  
The author was unable to obtain the data pertaining to the number of witnesses 
per SASC hearing, but suspects that the same type of restructuring has occurred 
within these hearings as well. 
C. IMPORTANCE OF RESULTS 
 Each year the President submits a budget request to Congress on behalf 
of the DoD.  Much of the information contained within the budget request was 
prepared many months prior to the actual submission date.  Therefore, not only 
does Defense believe that need the resources they ask for in the budget, but 
they also request a certain level of flexibility in spending in order to meet the 
challenges of an uncertain future.  When Congress increases their control over 
spending, the DoD’s ability to effectively react to changes and uncertainties 
dramatically decreases. 
 The results of this thesis suggest that the Cold War era trends of 
Congressional control over Defense spending no longer show the same signs of 
continuous increase in the post-Cold War era.  A broad look shows that the 
levels of Congressional control over Defense spending to have reached a 
plateau.  The level of the plateau is high, but no longer appears to be increasing.  
From a short-term standpoint, year to year variations are often large.  Therefore, 
DoD leadership should be cognizant and prepared for sustained high levels of 
oversight, the form of which may vary from year to year.  Understanding the 
levels and trends of Congressional control over Defense spending could lead the 
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